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ABSTRACT
A method for determining spot prices in spatially separated
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basic physical principles of resistive electric networks. These
principles lead to additional constraints which transform the
trransportation network model into an electricity network model.
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instead of current flows are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Those who are near the army sell at high prices. Because of
high prices, the wealth of the common people is exhausted....
Therefore a wise general strives to feed off the enemy. Each
pound of food taken from the enemy is equivalent to twenty
pounds you provide by yourself. - Sun Tzu, The Art of War
The objective of this thesis is to extend the analysis of the equilibrium of
spatially separated economic markets to markets for electric power. Let us begin
with a general discussion of congestion pricing and the changes gripping the
electric power industry today.
Congestion Pricing Principles
Infrastructure includes complex physical systems that are integral to the
functioning of the economy. These systems include water, sewage,
communication, transportation, and electric power. Many parts of these systems
are natural monopolies, as it is much more efficient to have a single provider of the
service, and competition would lead to an extreme excess of expensive capacity.
For example, it would be absurd for a city to have multiple sewage systems and
to give every homeowner the choice of which set of pipes to connect.
Currently, the use of infrastructure systems is often free or heavily
subsidized, with the recovery of costs achieved through taxation. In fact,
inexpensive infrastructure may be used to lure firms to different locations. For
example, a municipality may induce manufacturing firms to relocate by offering
lower electricity rates, rather than the more obvious incentive (and less distorting
to the electricity market) of offering lower tax rates. To price the consumption of
infrastructure services, unit rates may be set equal to total cost of the system plus
a fair rate of return, divided by the total number of units expected to be
consumed. This leads to excess capacity, because capacity is expanded to meet
the needs of peak consumers, but the costs of expansion are paid by all
consumers. Thus, average cost pricing of infrastructure systems subsidizes peak
consumers and encourages congestion. In effect, average cost pricing encourages
overconsumption and peak usage which may be inefficient.
One solution is to charge customers marginal costs instead of average
costs. This solves the problem of poor capacity planning but introduces new
political problems. For instance, how do we deal with the transition to new rate
setting mechanisms? Individuals and businesses which took advantage of the
spread between marginal and average cost pricing should not be punished, and
many huge capital investments (from suburb divisions to electric generators)
have been based on average-cost or no cost access to infrastructure systems.
These issues are best understood through examples, as in the following
discussion of urban sprawl.
Free Highways and Urban Sprawl
Suburbs are a product of highways. By not paying the costs of highways, urban
sprawl is encouraged. It has been suggested that tolls should be imposed which
reflect costs. The first step could be to have higher tolls during rush hour. This
would spread out rush hour and alleviate some of the congestion problems. A
long-term objective might be to go towards real-time congestion tolls, perhaps
with radio stations announcing the tolls for the following two hours.
One problem with tolls on highways is that it may lead to congestion on
side streets without tolls. Ideally, there will be some technology which could be
implemented cheaply, does not involve the decrease in traffic flow caused by toll
gates, and covers all roads.
Another problem with congestion pricing is that it unfairly penalizes those
who already own suburban homes. They made their purchasing decisions based
on cheap infrastructure systems and there has never been any reason to expect
radical change. In order to make the transition to tolls, those who currently use
the roads must not be penalized. There will be tremendous political resistance to
change, and this resistance is not entirely unreasonable. In a sense, suburbs at the
ends of congested highways are the stranded asset of American cities.
With this general discussion of the problems of average cost pricing and
congestion tolls, let us examine more closely the infrastructure system which is
the focus of this thesis: electric power networks.
Recent Trends in the Electricity Industry
Inspired by the Reagan and Thatcher governments, there has been an
increasing push to privatize companies and to break up regulated monopolies in
the expectation of realizing the efficiencies of free markets. My research sponsor,
Professor W. Hogan, has been a particularly strong force in the move to
deregulate electricity markets. A concept that is at the heart of deregulation is
narural monopoly. According to economic theory, there are a few businesses, often
associated with the construction and control of infrastructure, which do not lend
themselves to free market forces. For example, in the case of subway systems, it
does not make sense to have competing companies construct parallel subway
lines and trains.
Professor Hogan's model of a competitive electricity market involves
separating the natural monoply components from the components of the
industry with room for competition. Clearly the transmission (transmitting
power at high voltages among power plants and wholesale customers) and
distribution (delivering power from distribution centres to retail consumers)
facilities are natural monopolies. The potential gains from allowing the market to
price electricity is outweighed by the cost of constructing parallel wires. This
high barrier to entry would leave companies in control of regional markets, and
ultimately government power would be needed to curb monopolist pricing.
Although few dispute the general argument for increased competition
among power generation companies, there has been much discussion regarding
the specific details of implementation and issues of equity. One of the most
difficult issues is that of sunk costs. The selling of bulk power from one company
to another is called wholesale wheeling. Currently, wheeling is tightly regulated,
especially across state or regional lines. As a result, many states have expensive
power generating plants that are only used to meet peak demand. If demand side
management programs flatten that demand or liberalized wheeling legislation
enables states with excess capacity to transmit their power to distant locations,
billions of dollars worth of generating plants will become worthless. Who pays
for the losses associated with these sunk costs is a complex and controversial
issue. This and other issues, such as how to use price bidding systems, whether
power should be dispatched by a centralized pool or through bilateral
agreements, and how fixed costs should be recovered form the complex
legislative and technical background to this thesis. In this thesis we will present
only a simplified model to clarify the mathematical foundations of electricity spot
pricing.
Thesis overview
This thesis starts with the analysis of simple transportation models,
following the methodology of Samuelson's 1952 paper on applications of
optimization to spatially separated markets. The equilibrium approach
commonly employed by economists views the equilibrium solution as the result
of individual actors taking advantage of differentials between their utility and
market prices, until the market price eliminates any advantage gained from
additional activity. This problem can also be phrased as an optimization
problem, with a central dispatcher planning activity so as to maximize the net
economic value of the whole system. The optimality conditions correspond
directly to the equilibrium conditions.
With demand and supply curves at each node of a transportation network,
equilibrium is achieved when the price at each node equals the marginal
economic value to consumers and the marginal cost for producers.
Transportation occurs at equilibrium when the cost of transportation is equal to
the benefit gained from transportation, where this benefit is a function of
consumer utility, producer costs and system capacity constraints.
After analyzing this transportation model, we discuss the physical
principles of electricity. Transportation networks are constrained by conservation
of flow. Electricity networks are additionally constrained in that current must
flow on the paths that minimize total power losses. These additional constraints
and the elimination of transportation costs transform the transportation problem
into an electricity problem that determines the spatial equilibrium for electric
current. Computational examples are used to illustrate these electric network
models.
This electricity model solves for current flows, but real markets have
demand for power, not current. The last section discusses where more work needs
to be done in order to use our model to approximate the behaviour of markets
for power instead of current. Also, a brief overview of Professor Hogan's vision
of spot pricing and futures contracts is given.
Chapter 2: Spatial Equilibrium in Transportation Markets
2.1 Equilibrium Formulation
Let us start with an analysis of the equilibrium of spatially separated
markets at the nodes of a transportation network. The spatial equilibrium is fully
specified by the quantity of goods supplied and consumed at each node, the
quantity transported between nodes, the market price at each node and the value
of adding additional capacity to the transportation lines between nodes.
At each node, i. there is a supply curve, P'(Q'). The value of P (Q') for a
given quantity produced, Q', is the marginal cost of additional production.
There is also a demand curve at each node, Pd(Qd) . The value of pd(Qd) for a
given quantity consumed, QYd, is the marginal value gained by a local consumer
by consumption of one additional unit. The integral of the supply curve at a
node, Pi(Q'), is the total cost incurred by production at that node, and the
integral of the demand curve, pd(Qd), is the total consumer value at that node.
The conditions on valid supply curves are that Pi (Q') is non-negative for all
non-negative Qs and is increasing in Q>. The conditions on valid demand curves
are that Pid(Q d) is non-negative and decreasing for all non-negative Qd. Note
that the quantities produced and consumed must be non-negative. Illustrative
examples of demand and supply curves for a node are shown below.
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At equilibrium, we should be able to find unique prices associated with
each node (P9) and each line (P"P ). Peq is the net value of having an additional
unit supplied at node i, and PýF is the net value of adding one unit of capacity to
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line i,j, given that the cost of transporting from node i to node j is Costi,j and the
capacity of the transportation route between these nodes is Capij. PiP is an
implicit "toll charge," i.e. it is what the economy is willing to pay for additional
capacity.
The objective of our problem is to determine the conditions under which
the demand and supply quantities at each node (Q' and Q'), the quantity
transported between nodes (Zij), the market price at each node (Pr), and the
market value of capacity (PiTP) for each line are all at equilibrium.
Throughout this thesis we will use Zi,j to denote the flow between nodes i
and j. Since the flow may be either from i to j or from j to i, Zij is unrestricted in
sign. In some cases, it is important that the flows are non-negative. For this, we
will use the identity Zi,j = Xi,j - Xj,i, where Xi, is the non-negative flow from node
i to node j.
We can divide the equilibrium conditions into four groups: feasibility,
supply equilibrium at each node, demand equilibrium at each node, and
transportation equilibrium on each transportation route. The essence of
equilibrium reasoning is that there are economic actors (consumers and
producers) in a market system. These economic actors have a utility for
consuming goods or a cost of producing goods. Through the dynamics of the
market, economic actors will change the quantites produced and consumed and
the market prices will change until some equilibrium is reached. So long as the
market price is less than the consumer's marginal utility, the consumer will
consume more until (1) some constraint is met, (2) the marginal utility decreases
until it reaches the market price, or (3) the market price rises to match the
consumer's marginal utility. Similarly, producers will seek to expand production
so long as their marginal cost is less than the market price. Equilibrium is the
state in which all prices and quantities lead to a stable system, At equilibrium, if
one actor gains economic value through increasing or decreasing their economic
activity, another will lose at least as much; in other words, there can be no
increase in net economic value at equilibrium. The following is an outline of the
equilibrium conditions:
Feasibility
In order for a flow of goods on the network to be feasible, the flow must be
conserved. That is, the net amount injected into the network at node i (Q' - Qd)
must be equal to the total outflow minus the total inflow at node i. Let us define a
node-arc incidence matrix, Nt, having a row for each node and column for each
flow Zij. Nt will have a 1 in the position (i, (i,j)), indicating that Zij is flowing out
of node i, and a -1 in the position (j, (i,j)), indicating that Zi,j is flowing into node j.
Thus the net injection at node i is (NtZ)i, and we have the constraint:
For each i: Q - Qd = (NtZ)i
Nt has a row for each node and a column for each arc. If we are using Xi,j, we
will use a node-arc incidence matrix, Nt, having twice as many columns, where
the right half of the matrix is the negative of the left half, since the flow on each
arc is composed of the positive flow Xij minus the negative flow Xji.
Also, there may be a limit on the amount that can be transported over a
given path (i,j). We then have the additional feasibilty constraints:
For each i,j: Xij 5Capij
The alternative representation of this using Zi,j is the following two sets of
constraints:
For each i,j: Zij 5 Capij
For each i,j: -Zi,j 5 Capi,j
Furthermore, all prices and all quantities produced and consumed must
be non-negative.
For each i: Qd, Q, Pd(Qd), Ps(Qs) > 0
Supply
First, let us examine this equilibrium problem from the perspective of producers.
The essence of equilibrium reasoning is that economic actors gain some utility
through producing goods so long as their marginal cost of production is less than
the market price. Since at equilibrium producers have no desire to increase
production, the market price cannot exceed the marginal cost of production:
For each i: IP < i p(Qi)
An additional constraint that strengthens this statement, is that if any quantitiy is
produced, the marginal cost must be equal to the market price:
For each i: [P(Qs) - Pq ]Qs = 0
Demand
Similarly, this equilibrium problem can be examined from the perspective of
consumers. At equilibrium, the market price cannot be less than the consumer's
marginal utility of consumption, or the consumer would increase consumption:
For each i: pq' 2 Pi(Q )
If any quantity is consumed, the marginal utility must equal the market price:
For each i: [~q. - Ijd(Qi)]Qd = 0
Transportation
The transportation equilibrium conditions follow similar reasoning. At
equilibrium, the cost of transportation between two connected nodes (i,j) must be
as least as great as the benefit of transporting an additional unit. This benefit is
the excess of the market price at node i over the market price at node j, less the
value of an additional unit of capacity on that arc.
For each i,j: Costi,j 2 pei - P - Pi0
If anything is transported, then the cost must equal the benefit:
For each i,j: [Costi,j - (Pp - Pq _ P p)]Xij = 0
In general, there is no value to adding capacity to a resource unless the existing
capacity is being fully utilized. There is value in building additional capacity on
an arc (PF ) only if Xi,j is at its upper bound, that is Xij is equal to Capi,j.
For each i,j: P' p [Capij - Xi,j] = 0
The following is a summary of the above equilibrium conditions:
Variables
Q supply quantity at node i
Qd demand quantity at node i
Zij quantity transported from node ito node j (= Xi,j - Xji)
Peq equilibrium price at node i
PIP value of additional capacity on line i,j
Data
P~(Q~) total cost of production at node i as a function of Q'
Pi (Q) total consumer value at node i as a function of Qi
Pi (QS ) marginal cost at node i for a given supply quantity
(supply curve)
PIi(Qd) marginal utility at node i for a given demand quantity
(demand curve)
Costi,j cost of flow between nodes i and j
Capij constraint on flow between nodes i and j
Nt node-arc incidence matrix
Equilibrium Conditions:
Feasibility
For each i:
For each i,j:
For each i,j:
Supply
For each i:
For each i:
Demand
For each i:
For each i:
Q - Qd
Xi,j
Zi,j
Qid, Q, Xi,j
[Pi(Qi) - peq ]Q
[Pq- (Qid)P] Qd
Pi
Transportation
For each i,j:
For each i,j:
For each i,j:
[Costi,j - (Pq _- P - P• p)]Xi,
Costi,j
P p" [Capi,j - Xi,j]
0
peq _ p!q_ - pcaP
0
2.2 Optimization Formulation
In the previous section, we have provided economic intuition for the
models that will follow by using an equilibrium approach. The optimization
view of these spatially separated market equilibrium problems is that there is a
central optimizer vho maximizes net economic value (NEV) by exploiting each
resource until its marginal value is exhausted. The resulting optimality
conditions follow directly from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. We will show that
these optimality conditions are the same as the equilibrium conditions discussed
above.
Given a transportation network with demand and supply curves at each
node, our problem is to find the production and consumption at each node and
transportation between nodes that optimizes net economic value (NEV), which is
defined as the value gained through economic activity less the cost of this
activity. In our case, NEV is the consumer value, Pd (Q ), less the producer cost,
P (Q'), and the transportation cost, Costi,j Xi,j, summed over all nodes and arcs.
The flow of goods between markets must be conserved, capacity
constraints must be observed, and transportation may incur a cost. In general,
our problem formulation will take on the following form:
(NtZ)i
Capi,j
Xi,j- Xj,i
0
0
PS(Qi)
0
Pd(Qd')
Max NEV = Consumer Value - Producer Cost - Transportation Cost
Subject to:
(1) Flow is Conserved.
(2) Flow does not exceed capacity limits of arcs between nodes.
(3) Supply and demand price and quantity limits are not exceeded.
Using the notation from the previous section, this formulation is the
maximization of NEV subject to the feasibility constraints of the equilibrium
formulation:
Max NEV = (P(QF d)- P (Qs))- Costi Xii
i i,j
Subject to:
Balance For each i: Q - Q = (NtX)i
Capacity For each i,j: Xi,j 5 Capij
Q, Q, ,Xij 2 0
We can gain insight into the solution of this problem through application
of non-linear programming theory. In general, the math programming problem:
Max c(x)
s.t. Ax 5 b
x20
has the following optimality conditions:
Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
Ax 5 b
x20
A'n _2 Vc(x)
t>20
7rt (Ax- b)= 0
(At'r- Vc(x))t x = 0
Note that this optimization problem is truly general for a non-linear objective
function with linear constraints, as > constraints can be be transformed into 5
constraints by multiplying by -1, and equality constraints, Mx = b, can be
replaced by the constraints Mx < b and Mx > b (equivalently, -Mx < -b), as both
sets of constraints are satisfied only if the equality constraint is satisfied.
We can apply these optimality conditions to our market equilibrium
transportation problem specified above. Applied to our optimization problem
above, we have the following optimality conditions:
K-T Conditions Shadow Prices
Balance - For each i: Q - Q = (NtX)i
Cap - For each i,j: Xij Capi,j :i,
Qd , Qs, Xi,j 2 0
For each i: P q < P (Q ) :Qis
For each i: peq > iP(Q id ) :Qid
For each i,j: Costi,j 2 peq - pq p, :Xij
Pe, pcap > 0
Complementarity:
For each i: [Pi(Qs) - pe ]Qi = 0
For each i: [P~ - Pi(Qd)]Qid = 0
For each i,j: [Costi,j - (Pr - Pq - PaP)]Xi,j = 0
For each i,j: Pý [Capi,j - Xi,j] = 0
Note that although these conditions arise from optimization theory, they
are the same and have the same interpretation as the equilibrium condtions in
section 2.1. The implication of this is that the equilibrium conditions, which are
formulated from a local perspective, with individual actors seeking to fulfill their
individual interests, actually act to maximize net economic value. This makes
sense, since equilibrium implies that if one individual changes his activity to seek
greater utility, another will lose at least as much. In the aggregate, this kind of
tradeoff at equilibrium naturally leads to maximizing NEV. Conversely, the
global optimization approach which seeks to maximize NEV subject only to
feasibility constraints, actually achieves equilibrium. This is also a very natural
extention of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Although the optimization problem is
formulated from a global perspective, for this model, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are local conditions that are identical to equilibrium.
Although this reasoning relating equilibrium and optimality makes
intuitive sense, it is merely a fortunate consequence of the special structure of
this problem. For more general problems, it is not necessarily true that every
equilibrium solution will be globally optimal. In general equilibrium problems,
many cases arise where local equilibria exist that do not satisfy global optimality
conditions. Simple cases can be readily found in introductory game theory
textbooks.
2.3 Three Interesting Special Cases
In this section we will develop the optimization formulation of the
previous section and discuss its optimality conditions with different supply and
demand curves. We will make a switch of notation to make the implementation
more transparent. Below is a summary of the new notation; its meaning will
become more evident through the examples.
Variables
supi
consi
Zi,j
Line
xLinei,j
Data
Costi,j
LineMaxi,j
Nt
Step Curve
Si
Di
PSi
PDi
PSisupi
PDiconsi
supply quantity at node i
demand quantity at node i
quantity transported from node i to node j (= Xij - Xj,i)
equilibrium price at node i
value of additional capacity
cost of flow between nodes i and j
constraint on flow between nodes i and j
node-arc incidence matrix
Data
Maximum supply quantity at node i
Maximum demand quantity at node i
Supply price limit at node i (marginal cost)
Demand price limit at node i (marginal utility)
total production cost at node i
total consumer value at node i
Linear Curve Data
mSi supply curve slope at node i (intercept is at 0)
IntDi demand curve intercept at node i
-mDi demand curve slope at node i
mSisupi marginal cost at node i
IntDi - mDiconsi marginal utility at node i
mSisupi2/2 total production cost at node i
IntDiconsi-mDiconsi 2/2 total consumer value at node i
2.3a Single Step Supply and Demand Curves
First we will look at the implications of the single step curves shown below.
Pricei
Psi
Pricei
PDi
Supplyi
supi Si  consi Di
At each node there is one producer and one consumer. A consumer at
node i is willing to spend up to his price limit of PDi dollars per unit, and is
willing to purchase at most Di units. A producer at node i incurs a cost of PSi
dollars per unit and is willing to produce at most Si units. As a cost must be
incurred on the absolute value of the flow between nodes, the flow on each arc,
Zi,j, is represented as the difference between two non-negative flow variables, Xi,j
and Xj,i. As in this formulation Xi is a different arc from Xj,i, the node-arc
incidence matrix, Nt, has twice as many columns as in a formulation without
transportation costs that uses Zij = (Xi,j - Xj,i).
The constraints are:
(1) flow must be conserved at each node,
(2) supply at each node (supi) cannot exceed the maximum supply
quantity (Si),
(3) consumption at each node (consi) cannot exceed the maximum
demand quantity (Di),
(4) The amount transported across a line cannot exceed the line's
maximum capacity,
(5) the quantities produced, consumed and transported in a given
direction on an arc must be non-negative.
The objective function maximizes net economic value, which is consumer value
less producer and transportation costs, aggregated over all nodes and arcs. The
total consumer value at node i is PDiconsi. The total producer cost at node i is
PSisupi. The transportation cost incurred on arc (i,j) is Costi,jXi,j + CostijXj,i.
Below is the formulation of our model:
Max (PDiconsi 
-PSi supi) - Costi,jXi,j
iel i,jel
Subject to:
Demand i
(1) Balance: sup - cons = NtX
(2) Supply: Vi e I, supi - Si
(3) Demand: Vi e I, consi < Di
(4) LineMax: Vi,j e I, Xi,j < LineMaxi,j
(5) supi, consi, Xij 2 0
Dual Formulation
In general, the optimization problem,
Primal
Max c(x)
s.t. Ax 5 b
x20
where c(x) is a linear function of x, has the following dual problem,
Dual
Min irb
s.t. A'nr Vc(x)
The optimality conditions for the primal problem (and/or the dual problem) are
(1) primal feasibility, (2) dual feasibilty, and (3) complementary slackness holds.
Explicitly, these conditions are:
primal feasibility
Ax 5 b
x20
dual feasibility
Atir > Vc(x)
it20
complementarity
,
t (Ax- b)= 0
(A'; - Vc(x)) tx = 0
In order to form the dual of the linear program given above, we first define the
dual prices for each constraint as follows:
ibali dual variables for Balance constraints (dollars/unit)
market price at node i
ISi dual variables for Supply constraints (dollars/unit)
marginal cost of expanding production capacity at node i
IDi dual variables for Demand constraints (dollars/unit)
marginal cost of increasing consumption at node i
nLinei,j dual variables for LineMax constraints (dollars/unit)
marginal cost of increasing capacity of line i,j
Dual variables are equivalent to shadow prices on primal constraints,
which are the value of increasing the right hand side (availability of a resource in
the case of a < constraint) by one. Because relaxing an inequality constraint
cannot decrease the objective function, these dual variables (such as nSi, nDi,
nLinei,j) are non-negative. For primal equality constraints, the corresponding
dual variables are unrestricted in sign. Whereas the primal seeks to maximize
consumer value, the dual looks at the bottleneck resources and finds the correct
prices associated with these resources, so as to find the optimal solution that
minimizes costs. [Note: Eliyahu Goldratt's book The Goal gives a very good, non-
mathematical discussion of "bottleneck" reasoning.] The following is the dual
formulation of the linear program given above:
Min Z= Si + Dir + LineMaxr e
iel i,jel
Subject to:
(1) VieI, _+ s > -PSi
(2) Vi I, +ErI, +Z + 2i PDi
S+.i+i..e > -Costi,j(3) Vi, je I, -bri9al + bal -"Csti
4bal free
Srisd line 0
Let us now discuss an interpretation of these constraints by group:
Group 1: At each node, the market price cannot exceed the supply price limit
plus the cost of expanding production capacity, otherwise the producer would
benefit by increasing production.
Group 2 At each node, the market price must be at least as great as the difference
between the consumption price limit and the marginal cost of expanding the
capacity to consume, otherwise the consumer would benefit by increasing
consumption.
Group 3: The cost of transportation from node i to node j must be at least as great
as the market price at node i less the market price at node j and the cost of line
capacity, otherwise there would be an increase in net value by transporting one
unit from node i to node j.
Review the equilibrium formulation in section 2.1 for a more detailed
discussion of these constraints.
Complementarity Conditions
For the linear program and its dual discussed above, the complementarity
conditions are:
(1) Vi e I, Si[Si - supi] = 0
(2) Vi e I, Di[Di - consi] = 0
(3) Vi,j e I, EiLinei,j[LineMaxi,j - Xi,j] = 0
(4) Vi,j e I, [Costi,j - (+nbali - nbalj -nLinei,j)]Xi,j = 0
(5) Vi e I, [PSi - (+xbali - nSi)]supi = 0
(6) Vi e I, [(+nbali + nDi) - PDilconsi = 0
These complementarity conditions have an intuitive economic
interpretation that closely follows our discussion of equilibrium conditions in
section 2.1. Where each constraint represents a limited resource needed to
produce the different goods, the dual variables, n, represent the value of an
additional unit of each resource. The principle underlying complementarity is
that the dual variable corresponding to an inequality constraint is non-zero only
if the inequality is tight. This is because dual variables are the value of relaxing
constraints, and if an inequality is not tight, then changing its right hand side will
have no effect on the objective value. Following is a discussion of the individual
complementarity conditions. The numbers correspond to the numbers in the
constraints listed above.
(1) The benefit of an additional unit of supply capacity at node i, nSi, is
positive only if the amount supplied, supi, is at its upper bound, Si. nSi is the
value of increasing Si by one unit.
(2) The reasoning for demand mirrors the reasoning for supply. The
benefit of having additional demand at node i, nDi, is positive only if the amount
coinsumed, consi, is at its upper bound, Di. nDi is the value of increasing Di by
one unit.
(3) Similarly for transportation, for a line (i,j) the value of an additional
unit of line capacity, iLinei,j, can only be non-zero if the amount shipped, Xij, is
at the line's maximum capacity, LineMaxi,j. nLinei,j is the value of increasing
LineMaxi,j by one unit.
(4) At optimality, the marginal benefit of transporting one additional unit
from node i to node j is the difference in the market prices (nbali -nrbalj) less the
cost of line capacity. Only transport across line(i,j) if the cost is equal to the
benefit. Note that the cost must be at least as great as the benefit in order to
maintain dual feasibility.
(5) Only supply at node i if the supply price limit is equal to the market
price less the cost of increasing production capacity (if capacity is at its limit). To
maintain dual feasibility, the supply price limit must be at least as great as these
costs of additional supply.
(6) Only consume at node i if the benefit of consuming an additional unit
(including the cost of increasing max demand if demand is at its limit) is equal to
the price. To maintain dual feasibility, the price is never more than the benefit of
additional consumption.
One important concept is the market equilibrium price (PEQ).
Market Equilibrium Price = PD-nD
= PS+nS
The market equilibrium price is the price seen by new entrants to the market. If
there is an excess of consumers, then there should be no profit captured by new
entrants, so the price should be PD (nD is 0 with excess consumers). On the other
hand, new producers will gain the gap between their costs and the market price;
hence, irS=market price-PS. In the converse situation where there is excess
supply, new producers should not make a profit by producing additional units;
hence, the market price is set at PS. Following similar reasoning, IS is 0 when
there are excess producers and nD is the excess of PD over the market price. This
market equilibrium price will play a central role throughout this thesis.
2.3b Impact of Free, Unlimited Transportation
Let us look at an interesting special case of the above formulation that can be
optimally solved by using a simple heuristic method. The above formulation is
greatly simplified when there is no cost of transportation and the flows on the
arcs are not bound. That is, Costij =0, and LineMaxi,j = M, where M is some very
large number that is never reached unless the optimal solution is unbounded.
This greatly simplified formulation is:
Max 2(PDicons i -PSi supi)
idI
Subject to
sup - cons = NtZ
supi < Si
consi 5 Di
supi, consi 2 0
In this case, the problem can be reduced to one node. Suppose that the
demand price limits (PDi) are ordered from highest to lowest (PD1, PD 2, PD 3,...).
Similarly, order the supply price limits from lowest to highest (PS 1, PS 2, PS3,...).
One heuristic method for finding an optimal solution is to construct aggregate
demand and supply curves as shown below, and to find the largest demand
quantity such that with the same size total supply quantity, the marginal PDi >
PSj. This is equivalent to laying the two graphs on top of one another, and
finding where they intersect. Note that on these aggregate graphs, the total
supply must equal the total demand.Also note that since transportation is free, it
is very likely that there are multiple optimal solutions. Below are examples of
aggregated demand and supply graphs for a three node network:
Price
Price
PS3
PS2
PS,
-Total
I I Total
iotal I SUDDIVv
D1 D1+D2 Demand S 1  S1+S 2  ""rr·-
D1 +2+D3 S1+S2+S3
2.3c Linear Supply and Demand Curves
Linear demand and supply curves at each node (as shown below) are an
extention of the discrete curves introduced above in section 2.3a.
Price
Price
PEQ
PEQ = mS*sup msmS sup
Suvvlv Demand
sup cons
Note that with these curves there is no need to constrain cons and sup. As
a consequence of the slopes of the curves, consumption and production will be
limited by diminishing marginal returns as the equilibrium increases. In all other
respects, the constraints are the same. The objective is still to maximize the total
consumer value less production and transportation costs. The transportation cost
is computed in the same way as above; however, we must integrate to find the
areas under the demand and supply curves in order to determine the consumer
value and producer cost respectively. For the supply curve at node i, the slope is
mSi. If supi units are produced, the marginal cost of the supith unit is mSisupi.
The total cost is represented by the area under this curve, which is supi2 mSi/2.
For the demand curve at node i, the slope is -mDi and the intercept is IntDi. The
intercept represents the maximum amount that the consumer is willing to pay for
the first unit of goods to be consumed (that is, the consumer's utility). The total
consumer value at a node for a given consi is the area under the curve. This
trapezoidal area is (IntDiconsi - consi 2mDi/2). If consi units are consumed, the
marginal value of the last unit consumed is (IntDi - mDiconsi).
One way of conceptualizing these linear curves is as the aggregation of
many step curves. When the price is cheapest, everyone is willing to purchase the
goods; as the price goes up, fewer consumers have a utility that matches or
exceeds the market's high price. Similarly from the supply perspective, as the
price increases, more producers can cover their costs; hence, the curve is upward
sloping.
This problem can be formulated as a non-linear program (having a
separable, quadratic objective function and linear constraints) as follows:
I -- r ,
Max Z = (IntDiconsi - 2cons - isup) - CostijXij
iI i,jel
Subject to:
Balance:
LineMax: Vi,je I,
sup - cons =
Xi,j <
supi, consi, Xij 2
Later in this thesis, by way of a numerical example, we will show that if steps are
used to approximate a linear curve, by increasing the number of steps in the
demand and supply curves at each node, the solution will converge to the
solution of the approximated model with linear curves.
NLP Model Optimality Conditions
Extending our optimality analysis to this NLP model, we have the
following optimality conditions:
Kuhn-Tucker Conditions:
Balance: sup - cons = NtX
LineMax: Vi,i e, Yx:: < T.i5ieMax
supij, consi, X 0
Vi,j eI,
Vi e I,
Vi e I,
Complementarity Conditions:
(1) Vi,j E I,
(2) Vi,j e I, [
(3) Vi e I,
(4) Vi eI,
-xbal + bal +ie i
1 j ,Ja
,rbal >
+bali1
..ine >
1
,J
-Costi,j
-mSisupi
IntDi-mDiconsi
= Z
dXi,j
- dZ
dsupi
= dZ
dconsi
free
0
xLinei,j[LineMax - Xi,j]
Costi,j - (+7rbali - 7balj - eLinei,j)]Xi,j
[mSisupi- 7rbali ]supi
[7rbali - (IntDi - mDiconsi)]consi
=0
=0
=0
=0
The marginal cost of supply at node i is mSisupi, and the marginal value
of consumption at node i is IntDi-mDiconsi. The optimality conditions imply
NtX
LineMax
0
) -
that the market price (ibali) is never greater than the marginal cost; otherwise,
the result would not be optimal and more would be produced. The market price
is also never less than its marginal value; otherwise the result would not be
optimal, and more would be consumed.
The complementarity conditions further imply that if there is supply, then
the marginal cost of production must equal the market price (complementarity
condition 3), and if there is consumption, the market price must equal the
marginal value of consumption (complementarity condition 4); hence, if there is
both production and consumption at a node, then the marginal cost of
production must equal the marginal value of consumption. All of these
conditions are a specific application of the conditions discussed in sections 2.1
and 2.2, and the same intuition applies.
2.4 Reformulation in terms of Net Injections
Although the formulation in terms of sup and cons makes sense from an
economic perspective, leading to simple demand and supply curves, outside of
the objective function, the constraints are only concerned with the net injections,
yi = supi - consi. It would be nice to reformulate the model only in terms of yi.
This is facilitated by noticing that not only is the objective function quadratic, but
it is also separable by node. Let us now derive the objective function as a function
of only yi and the supply and demand curve data. This derivation is
accomplished by finding the optimal demand and supply as a function of the net
injection.
For simplicity of notation, let us use c and s instead of supi and consi
respectively. IntD, mS and mD are the parameters which define the demand and
supply curves for the NLP model discussed in section 2.3c above.
Given the net injection at a node, let us determine the optimal division
between production and consumption. This is accomplished by solving the
following quadratic program. Note that this is the same as our objective function
and balance constraint in the NLP model for a single node, but using our new
notation.
(1) net economic value = f(y) = max IntD c - .5 mD c2 - .5 mS s2
S,C
Subject to:
s-c = y
We would like to solve for s and c as functions of y. Let us work out the
algebra:
Substituting s = c + y into the objective function, we get:
h(y) = max IntD c -. 5 mD c2 -. 5 mS (c + y)2
At optimality,h(y = 0
ac
IntD-mDc-mS(c+y) = 0
Solving for c in terms of y, we get:
IntD-mSy = (mD+mS) c
c= 1
mC Dm (IntD - mS y)
mD+ mS
Solving for s, using s = y + c, we get:
s= 1
msD= m (IntD + mD y)
mD+ mS
To restate the objective function in terms of y, let us substitute c and s back
into the original objective function, (1).
To simplify notation, let us use K =
mD+ mS
f(y) = K ( IntD (IntD - mS y) -. 5 mD K (IntD - mS y)2
-. 5 mS K (IntD + mD y)2 )
This objective function is identical to the one in section 2.3c, but it has
eliminated the sup and cons variables.
Two Special Cases of Interest
Zero Net-Injections
An interesting exercise is to observe the case when the net injection (y) at
each node must be 0. This occurs when sup=cons. Substituting y= 0, we get:
f(y) = K (IntD2 - .5 mD K (IntD) 2 -. 5 mS K (IntD) 2)
This is the net economic value when supi = consi = IntDi/(mSi+mDi). This is the
intersection of the demand and supply curves, as shown in the figure below.
IntDi
NI
Price
Yi =supi' -cons =0
uction and
umption
suPi =consi =IntDi/(mS i +mDj)
Unconstrained Solution
A second interesting exercise is to solve for the net-injection that
maximizes the objective function if there are no constraints.
af(y·)The unconstrained optimum is at = 0
ay
0 = -IntD mS + mS mD K (IntD - mS y)
- mS mD K (IntD + mD y)
Divide through by mS, and cancel terms:
0 = -IntD - mD K mS y- mD K mD y
y =IntD
mD K(mS + mD)
= IntD
mD
As shown in the figure below, this represents the case where at each node the
consumers consume until all demand is satisifed, but there are no producers.
Obviously this solution violates the constraint of balancing net consumption with
net supply, but it is the intuitive solution to maximizing the objective function
without any constraints, and serves as an additional check on our mathematical
manipulations.
Yi =suPi -cons i =-IntD i/mDi
uction and
5umption
Price
NE
supi =0 cons i =IntD i/mDi
3 Electricity Principles
In order to apply our spatial equilibrium models to electricity, we need a
grounding in the basic physical principles of electricity. We will only deal with
direct current resistive networks, meaning that the voltages and currents do not
vary with time.
A resistive electric network, like any transportation network, can be
defined by a node-arc incidence matrix, Nt. In addition, a resistance (Ri,j) is
associated with each arc. Each node in the network has a voltage (Vi) and each
arc has a current (Ii,j) flowing through it. The basic relations we will need are:
(1) Ohm's Law: Vi-Vj = ijRij
(2) Kirchoff's Current Law (KCL):
The sum of currents into each node equals zero,
i.e. NtI = 0
(3) Power definition:
Power flowing into line: Pi = V Ii,
Power flowing out of line: Pj = Vj i,j
Power loss on line: Pj (Vi-Vj) I,
Through the application of Oh's Law, this becomes:
Pi,j = Iij2Ri,j
Alternatively, Ohms's Law can be applied to get the
relation: Pi,j = (Vi-Vj) 2/ R i, j
In the next section we will see these laws in action through application to simple
examples.
3.1 Resistive Network Analysis
In the following diagram, nodes 1 and 2 are at voltages V1 and V2 respectively.
They are connected by a wire which has resistance R12 and through which a
current of 112 is flowing. This is the simplest element of an electric network.
Ohm's Law states that the voltage difference, current and resistance must
obey the following relationship: (V1-V 2)=I12*R12.
Power is defined as the product of voltage and current. The amount of
power flowing into the line is I12*V 1. The amount of power flowing out of the
line is I12*V2. The amount of power dissipated (lost) by the line is I12*(Vi-V2). In
a transmission line, the magnitude of the voltages are very high relative to the
voltage differences; hence, the amount of power dissipated by a line is very small
relative to the amount of power flowing on the line. As will be seen below
through our analysis of parallel resistance, although the amount of power lost is
small and may in fact be ignored in a first approximation, the relative resistances
are wholly responsible for determining the flows of power in an electricity
network.
V1 R12 V2
112
Suppose that we connect two of these wires in series, as in the diagram
below. Ohm's law must hold for each wire, so (V1-V 2)=I12*R12 and (V2-
V3)=I23*R12. Here, we must introduce Kirchoff's Current Law (KCL), which
states that electric current behaves like water in pipes, obeying the conservation
of flow. Thus, the directed current flows must sum to zero at every node. Hence,
I1=I2. Furthermore, when resistors are connected in series, the effective resistance
across the series resistors is the sum of the resistances. That is, the resistance
between node 1 and node 3 is (R12+R23). The following three equations follow
directly:
112 = 123
(V1-V2) = I12*R12
(V2 -V3 ) = I23*R23
This imples:
(V1-V2)/R12 = (V2-V 3)/R 23 .
and furthermore:
VI-V 3  = 112 = I 23.
R12 + R23
V1 R12  V2  R23 V3
112 123
In the diagram below, we introduce parallel resistance. According to
Kirchoff's Current Law, the currents at node 1 must sum to zero, which explains
why the incoming current, IT, must be (I1+I2) if the currents flowing across
resistors R1 and R2 are Il and 12 respectively. By applying Ohm's Law to both
resistors, we get:
I1 = (V 1 - V2)
12 = (Vl - V2)
Therefore:
11+12 = V1-V 2 +V1-V 2
R1 R2
=1 1(Vi - V2 +(Ri R2)
Thus, the effective resistance of parallel resistors is RIR 2
R, + R2
Kirchoff's Voltage Law (KVL) further states that in a closed loop the
voltage differences must sum to zero. This is equivalent to saying that if one
absolute voltage is given in a closed loop and the currents are known, all the
other voltages can be determined from Ohm's Law. The voltage difference across
R1 is V1-V2 = I1*R1. Across R2 in the reverse direction (completing a clockwise
loop around the circuit), the voltage difference is V2-V1 = -I2*R2. By KVL, II*R1 -
12*R2 = 0.
The total voltage drop is equal to the voltage drop across each line:
R1R2 (I 1, +12) = IIR1 = 2R2R + R2
Hence, I = R2 ITRI + R2
and 12= R IR, + R2
We can compute the effective resistance between any two nodes in a more
complex resistive network by iteratively applying our rules for the computation
of series and parallel resistance.
/ Rl
/R2
Note that the above diagrams are merely components of larger electrical
systems. To actually generate currents and voltages, there must be some source
of power, such as a battery or a generator. We will now discuss power, and the
relationship between KCL and Ohm's Law.
3.2 Power Loss Minimization
A careful analysis of electric networks yields the following interesting
result: Ohm's Law corresponds to the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions of an
optimization problem to minimize the total power loss subject to Kirchoff's
Current Law, for given net current injections at each node. Let us use the
following parameters and variables in matrix notation:
Data
Nt node-arc incidence matrix
At reduced node-arc incidence matrix
(one node/row is eliminated)
R square matrix with the arc resistances as the diagonal entries
Y vector of net injections of current at nodes
(production minus consumption)
Variables
I vector of currents on arcs
V vector of node potentials (voltages)
The total power lost is the sum over all lines of the power lost on each line. The
power lost on each line is equal to the product of the resistance of the line with
the square of the current flowing through the line. Thus, total power loss is ItRI
in vector notation. Kirchoff's current law, which is merely the application of
conservation of flow to electric current, can be stated as Y = NtI in vector
notation. In mathematical programming notation, the problem of minimizing
power loss subject to the constraint of KCL can be stated as:
Minimize ItRI
Subject to:
KCL: Y = NtI
We would like to look at the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem. In
general, the optimization problem:
Min f(x)
s.t. Mx = 0
yields the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
Mx = 0
Vf(x) + Mt r = 0
For our particular problem, with the shadow prices, in, actually representing
voltages, V, these conditions yield:
2RI + NV = 0
in addition to the feasibility condition, Y = NtI. By changing the units of the
multipliers, Vi, we can reduce the above optimality condition to the more
familiar form of Ohm's Law: RI = NV.
As current is conserved, the sum of net injections of current over all nodes
is zero. Thus, if the net injections Y1 through Yn- 1 are known, Yn is equal to
-~ Yi. Let Yr be the Y vector with one node deleted. Let At be the node-arc
i=1
incidence matrix, Nt, with the row corresponding to the deleted node of Yr also
deleted. Eliminating this node from the problem, we can reformulate our power
minimization problem subject to KCL as follows:
Minimize ItRI
Subject to:
KCL: Yr = AtI
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions additionally yield: RI = AVr, where Vr is the vector
of node voltages with the node corresponding to the deleted node of Yr also
deleted.
Since Nt is a node-arc incidence matrix, each column sums to zero. Thus,
Nt is a singular matrix. In the reduced form, we can perform the following
manipulations to solve for the closed form of the optimal solution for Yr in the
mathematical program above:
(1) Multiply the Kuhn-Tucker conditions by R-1 (R-1 is just the square
matrix with the reciprocal of the arc resistances as the diagonal entries):
R-1AVr = R-1RI = I
(2) Multiply by At.
AtR-1AVr = I
(3) AtR-1A is square and invertible. Multiply by its inverse.
Vr = (AtR-1A)-1Yr
(4) From (1): I = R-1AVr. Multiply by R-1A.
I = R-1A(AtR-1A)-1Yr
In electrical engineering jargon, this matrix, R-1A(AtR-1A) - 1, is called H, the
transfer-admittance matrix.
An interesting property of this matrix is that the columns of H are the
vectors of current flows that result when the different columns of Nt are the net
injections of current into the network.
We can gain further insight into this problem when we see that if R is the
identity matrix, this optimization problem reduces to a least squares
approximation problem. [The following explanation of least squares follows from
Strang 1986, pp. 153 - 159] In general, the least squares problem can be stated as
follows: given a set of vectors defined by the column space of matrix C and a
vector b, we would like to solve for the vector x, such that Cx=b. Note that x
exists only if b can be constructed as a linear combination of the columns in C;
however, C may have more rows than columns, and the resulting system of
equations could be inconsistent. Suppose that b does not lie on the plane defined
by the columns of C. We would like to find the combination of columns (as
defined by x) that minimizes the square of the distance of b from this plane
(squared error). As shown in the diagram below, this problem can be reduced to
the problem of finding the matrix P that projects the vector b onto the column
space of C, and thus solves for x.
To solve this we see that the vector (b-Cx) must be perpendicular to the column
space of C; hence it must lie in the left nullspace of Ct. This means that:
Ct(b-Cx) = 0 or CtCx = Ctb
If the columns of C are linearly independent, then CtC is square, symmetric and
invertible; hence:
x = C(CtC)-lCtb
Let us see how this general least squares method can be applied to our
electricity problem. First, let us suppose that R is the identity matrix (e.g. all
resistances are 1 ohm). Recall our power minimization problem:
Minimize ItI
Subject to:
KCL: Yr = At I
The figure below is a geometric interpretation of this problem.
From this we can visualize the problem as finding the current vector, I*, from the
origin that is perpendical to the space of feasible current flows, given the vector
of net injections, Y. As K may be a matrix with (n-1) independent columns (each
column is perpendicular to the row space of At), it is clear that there can be
several independent current flows that satisfy conservation of flow with the
given net-injections, but there exists a unique I* that minimizes power loss.
A
F
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4 Electricity Problem Formulation
4.1 Differences from Transportation Problem Formulation
We would like to apply the transportation models for spatial equilibrium
to electricity transmission networks. In this chapter, we will apply the electricity
principles of the third chapter so that the transportation models can be applied to
electricity transmission networks. Unlike the transportation models that were
discussed in the second chapter, in electricty, we will not impose a cost for
transmission on the lines.Thus, we can replace our non-negative variables for
flow (Xij-Xj,i) by an unrestricted current flow variable, Zij, for each arc. (supi -
consi) now represents the net amount of current injected into the network. The
formulations explored in sections 2.3a and 2.3c need the additional constraints:
For each line (i,j): Ri,jZij = vi-vj
In matrix notation this is:
RZ = NV
The complete formulation for the non-linear model of secrtion 2.3c applied to
electricity networks is:
Max Consumer Value - Producer Cost
= Max ,(IntDiconsi- mDcons2 - isup)ieI 2 2
Subject to:
KCL: Vi e I, supi-consi = (Nt Z)i
Ohm: Vij, Resisti,jZi,j = Vi - Vj = (NV)i,j
LineMax: Vi,j e I, Zij <  LineMaxi,j
LineMin: Vi, je I, Zij 2 -LineMaxi,j
supi, consi, 2 0
Vi, Zi,j free
In addition to feasibility, the following Kuhn-Tucker Conditions must hold:
Vi,j e I, .- 7 + )CKCK + ;" X =- 0 = dz
dXi,j
NttOhm = 0
Vi e I, -_KCL > -mSisupi = dZ
dsupi
Vi e I, +i Kct 2 IntDi-mDiconsi = dZ
aconsi
ni KCL IOhm free
irLMax, rLMin > 0
At optimality, the following complementarity conditions will be satisfied:
(1) Vi, j I, KLineij[LineMaxi,j- Zi,j] = 0
Vi,j e I, irLinei,j[LineMaxi,j + Zi,j] = 0
(2) Vi e I, [mSisupi - iKCLi ]supi = 0
(3) Vi e I, [nKCLi - IntDi+mDiconsi]consi = 0
The linear programming model in section 2.3a is similarly modified, and the
intuition developed in sections 2.1 and 2.2 is still applicable.
4.2 Computational Example
Let us illustrate this model with a computational example using the
following network:
At each node there is a demand and supply curve for electric current. Electric
current flows must be conserved (KCL). The key difference from the
transportation models studied previously is that the electricity flows must
additionally observe Ohm's Law.
We will construct the examples so that the producers' cost curves are the
same everywhere. To keep this illustration simple, in every example the line
capacities (LineMax) will all be set at 6 and the resistances will be 1 for each arc.
We will look at different demand scenarios. This could correspond to the realistic
situation where geographic regions that are net consumers in the winter become
net suppliers in the summer, and vice versa. For the NLP model, all the supply
curves are the same, as shown below.
I
Marginal Costi= supi/15.
Price
PEQ
'15
Supply
sup
In our first scenario, the demand curves get a higher intercept and steeper slope
as the node number increases (demand is higher on the right of the network).
Intuitively, we expect that the left side of the network will be net suppliers, and
the right side will be net consumers. Let us arbitrarily choose simple demand
curves with intercepts equal to the number of the node, and with a slope
constructed so that the price for fifty units is 1 at every node. The parameters for
these curves are:
IntDi = i
mDi = (i-1)/50
Marginal Revenuei = IntDi-mDiconsi,
Pricei
ntDi-1 )/50
Demandi
consi
We will also look at the behaviour of a model that uses multiple step
supply and demand curves that approximate the above linear curves. For the
model with the piecewise constant supply and demand functions (an extention of
the model in section 2.3a), we will vary the number of steps and show through
numerical examples that as the number of steps is increased, the solution
converges to the solution for the NLP curves above. This approximation is
accomplished by choosing a maximum of 50 units produced and supplied at
each node, and breaking the curves into k steps (the k=2 curves are show below).
The price limits of the steps are set so that the curves of the NLP model cross the
midpoints of the steps, as illustrated in the supply and demand curves below.
Pricei
PSi,2 =mSi (1.5)(50/2)
PS i,1 =mSi (.5)(50/2)
PDi, 1 =IntDi-mD i
PDi, 2 =IntD i -mD i (
Sj=1/15
Suvvlv:
Si,l =50/2 Si,l +Si,2 =50
Pricei
Demandi
Di,1 =50/2 Di, 1 +q,2 =50
Analysis of Scenarios with Varying Demand Curves
Let us look at the behaviour of the NLP model under different demand
scenarios. For all of the scenarios (and all of the nodes in each scenario), the
supply curves are kept the same, with a slope of 1/15. For each of the nodes in all
of the scenarios, the demand curve is set so that with a local demand of 50 units
the price would be 1 [mDi = (IntDi - 1)/50]. All that is varied in the different
scenarios is the intercept of the demand curves:
Scenario 1: IntDi = i
Demand tends to be higher on the right-facing nodes.
Scenario 2: IntDi = 12 - i
Demand tends to be higher on the left-facing nodes.
Scenario 3: IntDi = 11 - 2 ii - 61
Demand tends to be higher on the left and right sides of the grid,
but lower in the middle.
Scenario 4: IntDi = 1 + 2 Ii - 61
Demand tends to be higher in the middle nodes.
Numerical results
The discussion in this section refers to numerical results in the appendices A and
B. Appendix A has a separate output listing for each of the four scenarios
introduced above.
In Appendix A, the first column is for the node number, which
corresponds to the node numbers in the eleven node network shown above. The
second and third columns, sup and cons, are the amount of current produced
and consumed at each node at optimality. The net injection column is the
difference between these two columns (yi). The next two columns are the
marginal cost and marginal utility at each node. The following column, nKCL, is
the shadow price on the KCL constraint for each node. ntKCL can also be
interpreted as the market price. The last column, V, is the voltage that satisfies
Ohm's Law at optimality, with the voltage of node 1 set to zero (recall that there
is one degree of freedom in setting the node voltages).
The bottom output for each scenario is related to the lines. The lines are
named by the nodes at the tail and head. For example, line 12 runs from node 1
to node 2 and line 1011 runs from node 10 to node 11. The Z column is the
optimal flow on each line. The ItLMax and tLMin columns are the shadow prices
on the line capacity constraints. The last column, nOhm, is the shadow price on
the Ohm's Law constraint. The interpretation of the shadow prices on the Ohm's
Law constraints is still an open question.
Appendix B contains the output for the LP step approximation to the NLP
solution for the first scenario. Output is given for the approximations with 2, 5
and 1000 steps in each demand and supply curve. Note that the output columns
for the LP results correspond to the output for the NLP results.
These results were generated using the GAMS code in appendices C (NLP
Scenarios) and D (LP approximations).
NLP Scenarios
In scenario 1, current flows in general from left to right, since the marginal
demand increases as the node number increases (see network picture above:
nodes are generally numbered from left to right). This is seen by looking at the
netinj column for scenario 1 in Appendix A. The net injection for the first three
nodes is positive, whereas for the remaining nodes it is generally more negative
(except for node 8).
With the regions of relatively high demand reversed in scenario 2, the
current flows in the opposite direction. An example of a situation that parallels
the shift from scenario 1 to scenario 2 is seasonal demand patterns. Suppose that
the left side is the north and the right side is the south. In the winter, the demand
will be higher in the north, but in the summer, demand will be higher in the
south. The economic situation of the suppliers would be more or less the same
year round, as the availability of coal, nuclear fuel and hydroelectric power do
not vary as greatly as demand with the changing seasons.
In scenario 3, there is net supply at the left and right sides of the grid
(except for node 9), whereas in the reverse case, scenario 4, all of the net
injections are coming from the nodes in the middle (nodes 5, 6, 7 and a little bit
from 8). A novel interpretation could be given to these two scenarios. For
scenarios 3 and 4 the grid could represent an industrial city surrounded by
residential suburbs. During the day, the demand is highest in the city (scenario
4); in the early evening, the demand is highest in the suburbs (scenario 3).
For illustrative purposes let us look at the numerical results from Scenario
1 in Appendix A to both explain the output and to get a feel for the implications
of the optimality conditions of the previous chapter. We will pick illustrative
numerical checks on our optimality conditions. Additional eyeballing of the
output can be performed by the reader.
feasibility - The column headed "Z" is the current flows on the lines. As all flows
are less than 6 and greater than -6, none of the line capacity constraints is
violated. The sum of the entries in the "netinj" column is zero (allowing for
roundoff error in restricting the output to two decimal places), indicating that the
KCL constraint (conservation of current flow) is not violated globally.
Ohm's Law is obeyed. For example, line37 has a flow of 5.26 and it
connects node 3 to node 7, which are at relative volatges of -6 and -11.26
respectively. For this line, Ohm's Law states that R37 Z37 = V3 - V7. With a
resistance of 1, this constraint is clearly obeyed. As a final feasibility check, note
that all quantities and prices are non-negative.
shadow price feasibility - As every node has both positive production and positive
consumption, the market price (nrKCL) is equal to both the marginal cost
(mSisupi) and the marginal utility (IntDi - mDiconsi) at every node.
The constraint on the Ohm's Law prices (NtnOhm = 0) is obeyed. For
instance, coming into node 3 is line 13, with rOhm13 = -0.15. Leaving node 3 are
line 37 and 38 with nOhrn's of 0.3 and -0.45 respectively.
-lcOhm13+iOhm37+lrOhm38 = 0
complementarity - All flows are positive, and thus none are at the -6 lower bound;
hence nLMin is zero for all lines. Similarly, it can be readily seen that xLMax only
takes on positive values for lines which are at the upper bound of 6..
NLP versus LP: LP version of Scenario I with varying number of steps
As an experiment, I ran the LP model with multiple steps on the first scenario,
with the expectation of getting a solution that approaches the NLP solution as the
number of steps is increased.
Appendix B clearly shows that as we increase the number of steps in our
approximation, from 2 to 1000, the multiple step LP solution converges to the
NLP solution for scenario 1 in Appendix A. All of the solution output converges
nicely, from objective value, to supply and consumption at each node, to market
prices, as expected.
One interesting property of the LP multiple step model is that it can
actually be used to model more general demand and supply curves than the NLP
linear curves. These curves could be used to approximate discrete or non-linear
or even discrete non-linear demand and supply curves of any form.
5 Modeling Power instead of Current
5.1 Implications of Arbitrary Voltages
Recall that our voltages satisfy the matrix equation RZ = NV, which is
Ohm's Law. As Nt is a node-arc incidence matrix, each row of N has only a 1 and
a -1; hence, if a constant is added to the vector V, it will satisfy Ohm's Law in
exactly the same way. This degree of freedom in the assignment of node
potentials determines the flow of power on the lines. These optimality conditions
specify that the current will follow the same path to minimize total power loss
regardless of the absolute voltages. In other words, the path power takes (H) is a
product of the network structure and current input, but given the same current,
the magnitude of the power injected does not affect the path.
As shown in Appendix A, for scenario 1 the vector of current injections, Y,
and the vector of relative node voltages, V, are as follows:
Yt = [12.0, 12.0, 5.3, -2.0, -2.0, -2.0, -4.5, 0.6, -8.7, -3.5, -7.3]
Vt = [0, -6.0, -6.0, -12.0, -12.0, -12.0, -11.3, -12.0, -16.1, -15.7, -19.5]
As Vt is a vector of relative, not absolute, voltages, the absolute voltages of the
nodes could be set to V + k E, where k is any scalar, and E is the vector of ones.
Hence, the power injected into the nodes is Yt [V + kE]. Since the sum of the net
current injections is zero (YtE = 0), YtV = Yt [V + kE]. If the units of Yt and Vt are
amps and volts respectively, YtV is the total power lost in the network, and has
the value of 346.7 watts for this example.
The total power lost can also be computed from ZtRZ, where Z is the
vector of current flows on the lines and R is the diagonal matrix of line
resistances. This gives the same result: 346.7 watts of power are lost through heat
dissipation by the resistance of the transmission lines.
Suppose that we increase the absolute voltage of node 1 to one million
volts (k = 1,000,000); the current flows remain the same and hence the power lost
on the lines remains the same, but the amount of power flowing across each line,
being transferred from to node to node, has been greatly increased. With high
absolute voltages, the power loss relative to the power flow is negligible. Thus, if
we are dealing with bulk power in a transmission grid, to a first approximation
we can treat all currents as if they are power flows in the unit of our choice, and
neglect all losses.
This last statement is the key to making the transition from markets for
current to markets for power. Consumers and producers are interested in
markets for power, not current. Suppose that our supply and demand curves are
not for current, but power, and sup, cons and Z measure power in megawatts
(MW). Although the analysis of electricity markets of the fourth chapter only
makes exact physical sense for current, at high voltages, the current can be
replaced by power as an approximation. In particular the demand and supply
curves make more sense when sup and cons are measured in units of power
instead of current, as consumers and producers are interested in current only in
so far as they view voltage as fixed and thus, power and current are
interchangeable measures of power (recall power definition: P=VI).
5.2 Application of Model to Congestion Tolls
Having established a spatial equilibrium model for electricity networks, the next
step is to use this model as a foundation for the computation of ex post congestion
rentals. By ex post, we mean a system whereby the prices are determined after
power has been dispatched. Given that power will continue to be dipatched as it
is currently, the historical hourly net injections can be used as input data,
whereupon the model will determine the flows on the network using the DC
resistive approximation and compute the spot prices at each node.
The next problem is what to do with the prices and what they mean. In an
electricity network, the prices at each node will have two components: losses and
congestion. Suppose that in our example problem of section 4.3, node 1 is a net
supplier, one other node is a net consumer, and all of the other nodes have zero
net injections. Due to losses, in order to consume one megawatt, more than one
megawatt must be injected at node 1. The farther away the consuming node
(where electrical distance is measured in effective resistance), the greater the
losses; hence, if there were no congestion, there would still have to be different
prices at each node to reflect the cost of losses. As losses on a line i,j are RijZij 2 ,
the marginal losses on a line are 2RijZij. At each node, the difference between the
spot price and the marginal loss is the marginal cost of congestion (congestion
toll). This decomposition of the spot price into loss and congestion components
could serve as the foundation of a futures contract system, whereby contracts for
the collection of future congestion tolls could be used to lock in a stable price for
power and hedge against the risk of fluctuating spot prices.
6 Conclusions
This thesis has discussed the spatial equilibrium problem introduced by
Samuelson in 1952. Through examination of the physical principles of electricity,
we have extended this model to markets for electric current, and ultimately,
electric power. It remains to be shown how this work ties in to Professor Hogan's
spot pricing system. The ultimate objective is to solidify the theoretical
foundation for a spot pricing system. Despite the introduction of a spot pricing
system that will ultimately lead to more rational capital investment decisions and
an equitable distribution of profits and savings, many consumers and producers
will not wish to be exposed to the risks of electricity price fluctuations. These
people will desire long term contracts so they do not have to add complex
hedging decisions to the long list of issues needed to successfully run a business.
In Professor Hogan's plan, before moving to a regular spot market with
financial derivatives, futures contracts could be established which entitle the
holders of a contract to collect the difference in spot price between two locations
for a fixed amount of power. This contract, which is a strictly financial
instrument and does not actually affect the dispatching of power, allows central
dispatchers to go about their job as they have in the past. Any spot pricing
system which requires substantial changes to the current mechanism of
dispatching power will probably encounter opposition to implementation.
One question that still puzzles me is the issue of equity. As has been
demonstrated in this thesis, the physical constraints of the system are responsible
for the congestion tolls. In a real situation, power companies will invest in
transmission capacity with the expectation of collecting congestion tolls. In a
normal business situation, if you open a donut shop and someone opens a nicer
donut shop next door that takes all of your customers, that is considered
acceptable "business risk". However, in the case of congestion tolls, addition of
transmission capacity may wildly influence the return on investment of existing
investors. It may be the case that the owners of expensive, necessary
infrastructure will make handsome profits until an upstart adds some
inexpensive incremental transmission capacity that eliminates most of the
congestion tolls. The application of the models in this thesis to a real, dynamic
system to determine long term contract prices is the natural continuation of this
work.
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Appendix A: NLP model scenarios 1 through 4
NLP Scenario 1: Objective Value - 1253.163
sup
15
25.85
30.1
30.65
33.03
34.83
34.6
39.1
33.57
38
35.78
cons netinj mSsup IntD-
mDcons
3
13.85
24.84
32.61
34.98
36.78
39.11
38.52
42.26
41.48
43.07
12
12
5.26
-1.95
-1.95
-1.95
-4.51
0.58
-8.69
-3.49
-7.29
1
1.72
2.01
2.04
2.2
2.32
2.31
2.61
2.24
2.53
2.39
1
1.72
2.01
2.04
2.2
2.32
2.31
2.61
2.24
2.53
2.39
Z wLMax
6 0.58
6 1.15
6 0.13
6 0.44
6 0.68
5.26 0
6 1.05
0.74 0
4.05 0
4.05 0
4.05 0
3.66 0
3.66 0
3.45 0
3.84 0
wLMin nOhm
0 0.15
0 -0.15
0 0.19
0 0.04
0 -0.08
0 0.3
0 -0.45
0 0.30
0 0.19
0 0.04
0 -0.08
0 -0.07
0 -0.07
0 0.15
0 -0.15
Node nKCL
-1
-1.72
-2.01
-2.04
-2.2
-2.32
-2.31
-2.61
-2.24
-2.53
-2.39
0
-6
-6
-12
-12
-12
-11.26
-12
-16.05
-15.66
-19.5
line
12
13
24
25
26
37
38
78
49
59
69
710
810
911
1011
NLP Scenario 2: Objective value = 1251.825
Node sup cons netinj mSsup IntD- TrKCL V
mDcons
1 35.811 43.063 -7.252 2.387 2.387 -2.387 0
2 35.905 42.257 -6.353 2.394 2.394 -2.394 4.772
3 35.717 41.368 -5.651 2.381 2.381 -2.381 2.48
4 37.157 39.449 -2.292 2.477 2.477 -2.477 8.48
5 36.027 38.319 -2.292 2.402 2.402 -2.402 8.48
6 34.625 36.917 -2.292 2.308 2.308 -2.308 8.48
7 33.143 34.881 -1.738 2.21 2.21 -2.21 4.611
8 30.569 32.701 -2.131 2.038 2.038 -2.038 8.48
9 32.625 20.625 12 2.175 2.175 -2.175 14.48
10 24.462 18.462 6 1.631 1.631 -1.631 14.48
11 15 3 12 1 1 -1 20.48
line Z TrLMax TLMin TrOhm
12 -4.772 0 0 0.006
13 -2.48 0 0 -0.006
24 -3.708 0 0 0.083
25 -3.708 0 0 0.008
26 -3.708 0 0 -0.085
37 -2.131 0 0 -0.172
38 -6 0 0.508 0.1 65
78 -3.869 0 0 -0.172
49 -6 0 0.386 0.083
59 -6 0 0.235 0.008
69 -6 0 0.048 -0.085
710 -6 0 0.808 0.401
810 -6 0 0 -0.407
911 -6 0 1.181 0.006
1011 -6 0 0.625 -0.006
NLP Scenario 3: Objective value = 1155.063
Node
line
12
13
24
25
26
37
38
78
49
59
69
710
810
911
1011
sup
15
31.286
36.537
33.744
33.744
33.744
34.4
31.783
36.201
28.097
15
Z
6
6
3.682
4.984
5.765
6
4.484
-1.516
-2.161
-3.463
-4.244
-2.963
-2.963
-6
-6
cons
3
22.856
32.053
39.587
42.19
43.752
41.917
40.676
32.333
28.171
3
nLMax
0.594
1.927
0
0
0
0.032
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
netinj
12
8.431
4.484
-5.843
-8.447
-10.009
-7.516
-8.893
3.868
-0.074
12
nLMin
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.905
0.382
TrKCLmSsup
1
2.086
2.436
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.293
2.119
2.413
1.873
1
IntD-
mDcons
1
2.086
2.436
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.293
2.119
2.413
1.873
1
-1
-2.086
-2.436
-2.25
-2.25
-2.25
-2.293
-2.119
-2.413
-1.873
-1
0
-6
-6
-9.682
-10.984
-11.765
-12
-10.484
-7.521
-7.521
-1.521
nOhm
0.491
-0.491
0.164
0.164
0.164
-0.175
-0.317
-0.175
0.164
0.164
0.164
-0.246
-0.246
0.491
-0.491
NLP Scenario 4: Objective value = 1365.406
Node
line
12
13
24
25
26
37
38
78
49
59
69
710
810
911
1011
sup
35.187
34.504
35.871
34.077
32.625
15
32.625
34.887
33.651
35.229
35.912
Z
-4.618
-3.465
0.012
-6
-6
-6
0
6
-0.012
6
6
3.73
3.73
6
1.117
cons
43.271
41.873
38.405
34.102
20.625
3
20.625
33.427
39.638
41.571
43.029
nLMax
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.04
0
0
1.329
0
0
0.196
0
netinj
-8.084
-7.369
-2.535
-0.025
12
12
12
1.46
-5.988
-6.343
-7.117
uLMin
0
0
0
0.194
1.215
0.327
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7TKCLmSsup
2.346
2.3
2.391
2.272
2.175
1
2.175
2.326
2.243
2.349
2.394
IntD-
mDcons
2.346
2.3
2.391
2.272
2.175
1
2.175
2.326
2.243
2.349
2.394
-2.346
-2.3
-2.391
-2.272
-2.175
-1
-2.175
-2.326
-2.243
-2.349
-2.394
0
4.618
3.465
4.606
10.618
10.618
9.465
3.465
4.618
-0.265
-1.382
nOhm
-0.046
0.046
-0.028
0.068
-0.086
0.111
-0.066
0.111
-0.028
0.068
-0.086
0.023
0.023
-0.046
0.046
,
Appendix B: LP model with var•ing number of stevs
LP: 2 Steps - Objective Value: 1166.58
PS+nS
1
1.75
2.5
1.75
2.13
2.25
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
PD-TrrD nKCL
1
1.75 -1.7
2.5 -2
1.75 -1.7
2.13 -2.1
2.25 -2.2
2.5 -2
2.5 -2
2.5 -2
2.5 -2
2.5 -2
-1
75
.5
75
13
25
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
0
-6
-6
-12
-12
-12
-6
-12
-18
-18
-18
Z uLMax
6 0.75
6 1.5
6 0.63
6 0
6 0.25
0 0
6 0
6 0
6 1.38
6 0
6 0
6 0
6 0
0 0
0 0
niLMin nOhm
0
0
-0.63
0.38
0.25
0
0
0
-0.63
0.38
0.25
0
0
0
0
Node
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
sup
25
25
25
25
25
25
31
50
32
38
50
cons
13
13
25
25
25
25
25
50
50
50
50
netinj
12
12
0
0
0
0
6
0
-18
-12
0
line
12
13
24
25
26
37
38
78
49
59
69
710
810
911
1011
LP: 5 Steps - Objective Value: 1243.59
Node sup cons netinj PS+nS PD-nD rKCL V
1 12 0 12 1 "+INF" -1 0
2 30 18.75 11.25 1.7 1.7 -1.7 -6
3 30 24 6 2 2 -2 -6
4 30 30 0 1.94 1.94 -1.94 -11.25
5 30 31.5 -1.5 2.2 2.2 -2.2 -12
6 38.5 40 -1.5 2.33 2.33 -2.33 -12
7 34 40 -6 2.33 2.33 -2.33 -12
8 40 40 0 2.37 2.37 -2.37 -12
9 30 40 -10 2.18 2.18 -2.18 -12
10 39.75 40 -0.25 2.33 2.33 -2.33 -16.5
11 30 40 -10 2.26 2.26 -2.26 -20.75
line Z nrLMax nLMin nrOhm
12 6 0.63 0 0.07
13 6 1.07 0 -0.08
24 5.25 0 0 0.24
25 6 0.52 0 -0.02
26 6 0.78 0 -0.15
37 6 0.3 0 0.04
38 6 0.48 0 -0.11
78 0 0 0 0.04
49 5.25 0 0 0.24
59 4.5 0 0 -0.02
69 4.5 0 0 -0.15
710 3 0 0 -0.04
810 3 0 0 -0.04
911 4.25 0 0 0.08
1011 5.75 0 0 -0.08
LP: 1000 Steps - Objective Value: 1253.16
sup
15
25.85
30.1
30.65
33.04
34.84
34.6
39.1
33.55
38
35.8
cons
3
13.85
24.85
32.61
35
36.8
39.1
38.53
42.25
41.5
43.05
netinj
12
12
5.25
-1.96
-1.96
-1.96
-4.5
0.57
-8.7
-3.5
-7.25
Z TLMax
6 0.58
6 1.15
6 0.12
6 0.44
6 0.68
5.25 0
6 1.05
0.75 0
4.04 0
4.04 0
4.04 0
3.66 0
3.66 0
3.43 0
3.82 0
PS+TTS PD-YTD
1
1.72
2.01
2.04
2.2
2.32
2.31
2.61
2.24
2.53
2.39
1
1.72
2.01
2.04
2.2
2.32
2.31
2.61
2.24
2.53
2.39
nLMin nOhm
0 0.15
0 -0.15
0 0.20
0 0.04
0 -0.08
0 0.3
0 -0.45
0 0.30
0 0.20
0 0.04
0 -0.08
0 -0.07
0 -0.07
0 0.15
0 -0.15
Node
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
TKCL
-1
-1.72
-2.01
-2.04
-2.2
-2.32
-2.31
-2.61
-2.24
-2.53
-2.39
0
-6
-6
-12
-12
-12
-11.25
-12
-16.04
-15.66
-19.48
line
12
13
24
25
26
37
38
78
49
59
69
710
810
911
1011
''I
AR~endix C: NLP Scenario 1 GAMS code
$OFFSYMXREF
options decimals=7;
option solprint = on;
options limrow=0;
options limcol=0;
option iterlim = 100000;
option reslim = 100000;
* $onmulti
Sets
I /1*11/
line /12, 13, 24, 25, 26,
Alias (I,J);
37, 38, 78, 49, 59, 69, 710, 810, 911, 1011/;
set LinkCols /1*7/;
Table LinkData(line,LinkCols)
1 2
24
25
26
37
38
78
49
59
69
710
810
911
1011
* Columns: 1=Frombus; 2=ToBus; 3:
* 6=TapRatio; 7=Phase Shift Angle
=Resistance; 4=Reactance; 5=Bcap;
Parameter Resistance(line)
LineMax(line)
N(line, I);
LineMax(line) = 6;
N(line,I) = 0;
N(line,I)$(ord(I) eq LinkData(line,'l')) = 1;
N(line,I)$(ord(I) eq LinkData(line,'2')) = -1;
* Resistance(line) = LinkData(line,'3');
Resistance(line) = 1;
Parameters
__111_____ ______1____1_
IntD(I)
mD(I) negative of demand curve slope
mS(I) slope of supply curve
Cost(line);
Cost(line) = 0;
IntD(I) = ord(I);
mD(I) = (IntD(I) - 1)/50;
mS(I) = 1/15;
*** note there is no assurance that marginal cost of demand doesn't
*** go negative!!!
Free Variable
Obj objective value
Z(line) flow on line
V(I) node potentials;
Positive Variable
cons(I) consumption at node I
sup(I) supply at node I;
Equations
Objfn
KCL, Ohm, LMax, LMin;
Objfn .. Obj =E= sum(I, IntD(I)*cons(I) - mD(I)*cons(I)*cons(I)/2)
- sum(I, mS(I)*sup(I)*sup(I)/2);
* for formulation with costs, must separate into Z(i,j)=X(i,j)-X(j,i)
KCL(I) .. sup(I)-cons(I) =E=
sum(line$N(line,I), N(line,I)*Z(line));
* Y = Nt.Z
Ohm(line) .. Resistance(line)*Z(line) =E=
sum(I$N(line,I), N(line,I)*V(I));
* RZ=N.V
LMax(line) .. Z(line) =L= LineMax(line);
LMin(line) .. -Z(line) =L= LineMax(line);
V.fx('l') = 0;
* note that there is one degree of freedom in the voltage
Model Discretel /All/;
Solve discretel Maximizing obj using NLP;
File disout /llsmooth.out/;
put disout;
disout.pc = 5;
* continuous page
disout.pw = 255; disout.nd=3; disout.nw=7;
* $include "outs2p.gms"
59
Parameter PrS(I), PrD(I), netinj(I);
PrS(I) = mS(I) * sup.l(I);
PrD(I) = IntD(I) - mD(I)*cons.l(I);
netinj(I) = sup.l(I) - cons.l(I);
put @2 , "I",@8,"sup",16,"cons",@21,"netinj ,@28,"PrS",@35, "PrD",
@42,"KCL.m",@49,"V"; put /;
loop(I, put @2,I.tl:3, @7,sup.l(I), @14,cons.l(I), @21,netinj(I),
@28,PrS(I), @35,PrD(I), @42,KCL.m(I),
@49,V.1(I); put /; );
put @2,"line",@8,"Z.1",@16,"RC Z.m",
@24,"PiLMax",@32,"PiLMin", @40, "Ohm.m"; put /;
loop (line,
put @2,line.tl:3, @8,Z.l(line), @16,Z.m(line),
@24,LMax.m(line), @32,LMin.m(line), @40,0hm.m(line);
put /;)
put "Data"; put /;
put @2,"I",@8,"IntD",@16,"mS",@24,""mD"; put /;
loop (I,
put @2,I.tl, @8,IntD(I), @16,mS(I), @24,mD(I); put /;
); put /;
put "Objective value:", obj.l:14:5; put /;
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$OFFSYMXREF
options decinmals=7;
option solprint = on;
options limrow=20;
options limcol=20;
option iterlim = 100000;
option reslim = 100000;
* $onmulti
Sets
I /1*11/
line /12, 13, 24, 25, 26,
Alias (I,J);
37, 38, 78, 49, 59, 69, 710, 810, 911, 1011/;
set LinkCols /1*7/;
Table LinkData(line,LinkCols)
12
13
24
25
26
37
38
78
49
59
69
710
810
911
1011
* Columns: 1=Frombus; 2=ToBus; 3:
* 6=TapRatio; 7=Phase Shift Angle
=Resistance; 4=Reactance; 5=Bcap;
Parameter Resistance(line)
LineMax(line)
N(line, I);
LineMax(line) = 6;
N(line,I) = 0;
N(line,I)$(ord(I) eq LinkData(line,'l')) = 1;
N(line,I)$(ord(I) eq LinkData(line,'2')) = -1;
* Resistance(line) = LinkData(line,'3');
Resistance(line) = 1;
Scalar steps; steps = 500;
Set part /partl * part500/;
Parameters
PS(I,part)
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S(I,part)
PD(I,part)
D(I,part);
S(I,part) = 50/steps;
D(I,part) = 50/steps;
Parameters IntD(I), MD(I), mS(I);
IntD(I) = ord(I);
mD(I) = (IntD(I) - 1)/50;
mS(I) = 1/15;
PS(1,part) = mS(I) * (ord(part)-.5) * 50/steps;
PD(I,part) = IntD(I) - (mD(I) * (ord(part)-.5) * 50/steps);
Free Variables
Obj objective value
Z(line) flow on line
V(I) node potentials;
Positive Variable
cons(I,part) consumption at node I
sup(I,part) supply at node I;
Equations
Objfn, Supply, Demand
KCL, Ohm, LMax, LMin;
Objfn .. Obj =E= sum((I,part), PD(I,part)*cons(I,part)
- PS(I,part)*sup(I,part));
Supply(I,part) .. sup(I,part) =L= S(I,part);
Demand(J,part) .. cons(J,part) =L= D(J,part);
* for formulation with costs, must separate into Z(i,j)=X(i,j)-X(j,i)
KCL(I) .. sum(part, sup(I,part)-cons(I,part)) =E=
sum(line$N(line,I), N(line,I)*Z(line));
* Y = Nt.Z
Ohm(line) .. Resistance(line)*Z(line) =E=
sum(I$N(line,I), N(line,I)*V(I));
* R.Z=N.lambda
LMax(line) .. Z(line) =L= LineMax(line);
LMin(line) .. -Z(line) =L= LineMax(line);
V.fx('l') = 0;
* note there is one degree of freedom in voltages
Model Discretel /All/;
* Discretel.optfile = 1;
Solve discretel Maximizing obj using LP;
File disout /lldisc.out/;
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*$include "outd3p.gms"
put disout;
disout.pc = 2;
* use quoted text, delimited by commas 5
disout.pw = 255; disout.nd=2; disout.nw=6;
Parameter maxPS(I), minPD(I), maxSupM, minDemM;
maxPS(I) = smax(part$sup.l(I,part), PS(I,part));
maxSupM(I) = sum(part$(PS(I,part) eq maxPS(I)), supply.m(I,part));
minPD(I) = smin(part$cons.l(I,part), PD(I,part));
mi:aDemM(I) = sum(part$(PD(I,part) eq minPD(I)), demand.m(I,part))
Parameter TotSup(I), TotCons(I);
TotSup(I) = sum(part, sup.l(I,part));
TotCons(I) = sum(part, cons.l(I,part));
Parameter PrS(I), PrD(I), netinj(I);
PrS(I) = maxPS(I) + maxSupM(I);
PrD(I) = minPD(I) - minDemM(I);
netinj(I) = sum(part, sup.l(I,part) - cons.l(I,part));
put @2,"I",@8,"sup",@16,"cons",@24,"netinj",@32,"PrS",@40,"PrD",
@48,"KCL.m",@56,"V"; put /;
loop(I, put @2,I.tl:4, @8,TotSup(I), @16,TotCons(I), @24,netinj(I),
@32,PrS(I), @40,PrD(I), @48,KCL.m(I),
@56,V.1(I); put /; );
put @2,"line",@8,"Z.l",@16,"RC Z.m",@24,"PiLMax",
@32,"PiLMin", @40,"Ohm.m"; put /;
loop(line,
put @2,line.tl:4, @8,Z.l(line), @16,Z.m(line),
@24,LMax.m(line), @32,LMin.m(line), @40, Ohm.m(line);
put /;);
put "Data"; put /;
put @2,"I",@8,"MaxPS",@16,"MinPD"; put /;
loop(I, put @2,I.tl:2, @8,MaxPS(I), @16,MinPD(I); put /; );
put "Objective value:", obj.l:14:5; put /;
Appendix E: Models and Results at a Glance
Ch. 2: Transportation Problem:
Equilibrium of Spatially Separated Markets for Goods
Max f(sup,cons) = Consumer Value - Producer Cost - Transportation Cost
Subject to:
Balance: -sup + cons + NtX = 0
LineMax: X < LineMax :71l
supi, consi, X 2 0
Optimality conditions in addition tofeasibilty:
grad(f(sup,cons)) - g = 0
Ng+70l < Cost
7i1 2 0
rl(LineMax - X) = 0
Ch. 3 Electricity Principles
Minimize ItRI
Subject to:
KCL: Y = NtI
Yields Kuhn-Tucker Conditions:
Ohm's Law: RI = NV
Where V is the vector of node potentials.
Closed Form solution,
Yr = AtZ
Z=HYr
H = R-IA(AtR-1A)- 1
Ch. 4 Electricity Problem
Equilibrium of Spatially Separated Markets for Electricity
Maximize
Subject to:
KCL:
Ohm:
LineMax:
LineMin:
f(sup,cons) = Consumer Value - Producer Cost
-s + co rnns + NtZ =
NV-RZ =
Z < LineMax :x1
-Z < LineMax :n2
supi, consi 2 0
V, Z free
Optimality conditions in addition to feasibilty:
grad(f(sup,cons)) - g =
Ngi- Rt3 + cl-. I 2 =
Nt =
IC2 >
cl(LineMax- Z) =
r2(LineMax + Z) =
Flkwa U
I
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